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Abstract 
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Introduction 
 
Oil prices did not fluctuate much before 1973. A few large US oil companies known 
as the “Seven sisters”, through price and production controls, stabilized the price 
during much of the twentieth century. Only when the Yom Kippur War started on 
October 6, 1973 the control of the crude oil price passed from the United States to 
OPEC and oil prices started to behave like prices of other commodities (see figure 1).  
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Figure 1. West Texas Intermediate Oil Price (US$/Barrel) from 1947 to 2003.  
Notes: source: Global Financial Data Inc..  
 
Since then, the impact of oil price changes on the world economy has been large. In 
fact according to Adelman (1993, page 537): “Oil is so significant in the international 
economy that forecasts of economic growth are routinely qualified with the caveat: 
‘Provided there is no oil shock’.” 
 
Not surprisingly, there exists a whole strand of literature that investigates oil prices 
and the impact of oil price shocks on the economy. Recent examples include Hooker, 
(1999), Amihud and Wohl (2003), Hammes and Wills (2003) and Leigh, Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2003). Other papers deal with the question whether oil price risk is priced 
in stock market prices (for instance Jones and Gaul, 1996). However, the question 
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whether oil prices might forecast future stock market returns has to our knowledge 
received no attention1,2.  
 
This paper fills that gap. Using stock market data of 48 countries, a world market 
index and price series of several types of oil, we find they do. We find statistically 
significant predictability, especially in developed markets. Stock returns tend to be 
lower after oil price increases and higher if the oil price falls in the previous month. 
This predictability is not only statistically significant but also economically significant 
in many countries. It is robust over time and does not seem to be tied to one or two 
specific sectors. This predictability can be found in all sectors in the different 
countries, where we find the effect present. In addition, as we have some indication 
that the oil effect might be linked to January effect and the Halloween effect, we also 
show that these results cannot be explained by these calendar anomalies.  
 
Our finding that changes in oil prices predict future stock returns is interesting for 
several reasons. It adds a new economic variable to the list of variables that seem to 
have forecasting power, adding a new perspective to the question whether or not stock 
returns are to some extent predictable. Especially interesting about the oil prices is not 
only its direct impact on economic growth, but also the notion that changes in oil 
prices might reflect or even predict changes in international stability, as considered by 
Leigh, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2003). In addition, our results also indicate that an 
investor might be able to profit economically from this predictability. A simple 
trading strategy generates economically significant outperformance around 4 percent 
annually (after transaction costs) in comparison to a risk corrected buy and hold 
benchmark. Although - as we have only one sample of oil returns - these results had to 
be based on in sample predictability results.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss the data and methodology 
and our main results. Section 3 contains our robustness tests. Finally, section 4 
concludes.  
                                                 
1 One reason could be that in the past, researchers considered the time period too short to test for 
predictability of this economic variable. 
2 Only Jones and Gaul (1996) refer to the possibility that oil prices changes forecast stock market 
returns but they leave this for further research. 
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2. The puzzle  
 
A. Stock market data 
We start our analysis in October 1973, because at this point in time, at the start of the 
Yom Kippur War, oil prices started to fluctuate. All series end in April 2003, so we 
base our results on almost thirty year of monthly observations. For our investigation 
we calculate (continuously compounded) monthly stock returns of the value-weighted 
market indices3 of 18 countries (local currencies4). These countries are: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. All series are end of the month MSCI reinvestment5 indices 
(local currency) over September 1973- April 2003. We also use data from markets for 
which MSCI reinvestment indices are available since 1988 or later. Table I contains 
the basic characteristics of all indices.  
 
Please insert table I around here 
 
Among these series are several emerging markets series6. Claessens, Dasgupta and 
Glenn (1995) argue that due to their higher degree of segmentation they provide an 
interesting ‘out of sample’ test. Whether or not emerging markets are (partially) 
segmented or integrated is still an ongoing discussion7. Many of these so-called 
emerging markets are, in fact fully “integrated” in the sense that there are no 
restrictions on capital mobility. We consider these series as a first ‘out of sample test’ 
for the robustness of an oil effect. We consider market returns of Argentina, Brazil, 
                                                 
3 One advantage of the value weighted indices is that these indices exhibit less autocorrelation and are 
less influenced by the January effect. Since the January anomaly is closely related to the small firm 
effect (see for instance Hawawini and Keim, 1995). 
4 We obtain similar results if we use indices measured in dollar returns. 
5 In the developed markets, MSCI calculates dividend reinvestment at the end of each month as 1/12th 
of the indicated annual dividend. There are no lags instituted for the reinvestment of the dividend. 
MSCI has constructed its Emerging Markets dividends reinvested series as follows: In the period 
between the ex-date and the date of dividend reinvestment, a dividend receivable is a component of the 
index return. Dividends are deemed received on the payment date. To determine the payment date, a 
fixed time lag is assumed to exist between the ex-date and the payment date. This time lag varies by 
country, and is determined in accordance with general practice within that market. Reinvestment of 
dividends occurs at the end of the month in which the payment date falls.  
6 For ease of reference, in the remainder of this paper we refer to the shorter series as emerging markets 
and to the long series as developed markets. 
7 See for instance, De Jong and De Roon (2001) or Bekaert and Harvey (1995). 
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Chile, China, Columbia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Jordan, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, the 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Turkey and Venezuela. For these shorter series we have at most 184 monthly returns 
of MSCI re-investment indices (local currency) starting from 1988. In addition we 
consider the MSCI world market index. Table 1 contains some basic characteristics 
for all markets.  
 
B. Oil price data 
The crude oil market is the largest commodity market in the world8. Total world 
consumption equals around 70-80 million barrels a day of which the United States 
consume approximately 25 percent. Several times total consumption is traded daily on 
crude oil, spot, futures and over-the-counter markets  at Exchanges in New York 
(NYMEX) and London (IPE). 
Prices of three types of oil – Brent, West Texas Intermediate and Dubai - serve as a 
benchmark for other types of crude oil. Processing costs and therefore prices of oil 
depend on two important characteristics: sulphur content and density. Oil that has a 
low sulphur content (“sweet”) and a low density (“light”) is cheaper to process than 
oil that has a high sulphur content (“sour”) and high density (“heavy”). For instance 
the price of West Texas Intermediate is generally higher than Brent oil as it is sweeter 
and lighter than Brent oil. Of total world oil consumption of 70-80 million barrels a 
day, Brent oil serves as a benchmark for between 40-50 million barrels a day, West 
Texas Intermediate for 12-15 million barrels a day and Dubai for around 10-15 
million barrels a day.  
 
Even though price differences do exist, oil prices tend to move closely together as 
shown in figure 2 and table III. 
                                                 
8 For a more thorough discussion on oil prices and markets we refer the reader to Levin et al. (2003), 
chapter 3 from which we took the information in the first two paragraphs. 
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Figure 2. Oil price development.  
Notes: Oil price development over the period May 1987 through April 2003 of four 
types of oil: West Texas, Brent, Dubai and Arab Light.  
 
We use several oil series in our analysis9. Firstly, we use the longest oil price series 
(end of the month prices) we could find from several sources for the three most used 
crude oil benchmarks Brent, West Texas and Dubai. In addition we used Arabian Gulf 
Arab Light Crude Oil Spot Price (US$/Barrel) and two futures series, one for 
NYMEX and one for the IPE.  
To save space we focus on results for the Arab Light crude oil as these series more or 
less give a good indication of our ‘average’ results for all series. However, results are 
independent to the oil series used in our analysis. 
 
Please insert table II and table III around here 
 
                                                 
9 Long oil series are not easy to find. While the IMF has longer oil series available for Brent and Dubai 
oil, these are average monthly series based on daily prices. As shown by Working (1960) these data 
might exhibit spurious correlation. Data from the International Energy Agency suffer from the same 
problem.  
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Table II contains some basic information for all these series and in table III we report 
basic characteristics of oil price changes (measured as log returns). This table also 
contains the pair wise correlations between these series.  
 
C. Methodology 
To test for the existence of an oil-effect we used the usual regression techniques. We 
incorporated an oil-variable oiltr 1− in the regression:  
 
t
oil
tt rr εαµ ++= −11  with ε t t t tr E r= − −1[ ]      (1) 
 
where µ is a constant and tε the usual error term.  
 
Note that in the absence of this variable this equation reduces to the well known 
random walk model. We tested whether the coefficient of oiltr 1−  is significantly different 
from zero. When α1 is significant, this rejects the null hypothesis of no oil effect. The 
advantage of using this regression is that one can easily include other variables, as we 
do later in this paper. 
 
D. Results 
Table I contains our estimation results for regression 1. We report detailed estimation 
results for the Arab Light only. If we found statistically significant results (at the ten 
percent level or higher) using other oil series we mark this with an ‘X’ in the table10. 
For the developed markets we find that the change in oil price significantly predicts 
future market returns in 12 of the 18 developed markets (all t-values are based on 
White standard errors). In all countries the effect is negative. That is, a decrease in 
this month’s oil price on average indicates a higher stock market return next month. 
The impact of changes in the oil price on stock returns tends to be large. For instance, 
a decrease of the oil price of ten percent in the US will double the expected return on 
the stock market in the next month. This oil effect is also significantly present in the 
world market index.  
 
                                                 
10 Also the t-values found, tend to be similar to the Arab Light oil results, regardless which series we 
use. 
 9
While less pronounced the emerging markets show the same effect. In most cases the 
sign of the oil return coefficient is negative and in 8 of the 30 emerging markets this 
effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Countries are ordered by the 
starting date of the stock return series. We find no significant predictability for the 
shorter data. This does not necessarily mean that there is no significant predictability. 
It might be that these countries do exhibit a significant oil effect but we simply do not 
have enough data to confirm this. All in all, these ‘emerging’ markets results suggest 
that our results are fairly robust. 
 
Just to give the reader some feel for the strength of these results, we compare in figure 
3 t-values one would expect under the null hypothesis of no predictability and 
estimated t-values. Note, that in this figure we assume that these markets are 
uncorrelated, which is too strong an assumption. In fact, we do find that the effect 
tends to be strongly driven by the returns in the world market. For instance, if we 
include the world market returns as an additional regressor in equation 1, we find that 
the effect is only significant for five developed markets (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland) and three ‘emerging’ markets (Jordan, Portugal and 
Israel).   
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Figure 3. Comparison of expected t-values with real t-values of the oil effect.  
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Summarising our evidence so far, we find a strong statistically significant relation 
between lagged oil price changes and stock returns. In the next section, we check the 
robustness of these results and consider some possible explanations. 
 
3. Possible explanations for the puzzle11  
 
A. Persistence over time 
This oil effect might be caused by some specific outliers in part of our sample. As a  
robustness check we simply divide our sample of developed markets in two equal 
periods (November 1973 through July 1988 and August 1988 through April 2003) and 
run the regression in equation 1 for both samples. In table IV we report the main 
results for these regressions.  
 
Please insert table IV around here 
 
While the effect is stronger in the second half of our sample (10 countries in the first 
half versus 14 countries in the second half with significant results) we do find the 
effect significantly present in both samples. This suggests that the effect is robust with 
respect to the sample period we consider. 
 
B. Halloween indicator and January effect 
The demand for oil is highly seasonal which might lead to seasonality in oil price 
returns. In addition, Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) show that stock market returns tend 
to be significantly lower during the summer (May trough October) than during the 
winter months (November through April). They refer to this puzzle as the Halloween 
indicator or the Sell in May effect. Surprisingly, we find that the countries where we 
find strong oil effects are similar to the countries where they find a strong Sell in May 
effect (for instance Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands). This suggests that the oil 
effect and the Halloween effect could be related. But there is more that suggests these 
                                                 
11 We have restricted our tests to explanations and robustness tests we found realistic to consider. 
However, we did many additional tests for which we do not report our results here to save space. But, 
for instance, we find no evidence that results can be explained by oil price risk in stock returns. Results 
are robust to the inclusion of the oil price change in the same month (not lagged) in our regression 1. 
We check whether results for the US and the world market were robust for US inflation and found that 
this dit not affect our results. We checked for a momentum effect in oil price changes that might cause 
a momentum effect in stock returns but found none in the oil prices.  
 11 
effects could be intertwined. Figure 4 contains average monthly returns for our Arab 
Light oil series.  
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Figure 4. Average monthly oil returns over the period October 1973- April 2003. 
 
Especially in the months August and September oil returns tend to be positive. And as 
Bouman and Jacobsen (2002) report (table 2) these two months and the month 
October tend to be the worst months for stocks. Given the negative relation we found 
between oil returns and stock returns, this suggests even stronger that the oil effect 
and the Halloween effect might be related. Moreover, oil price changes in December 
are negative on average. This could mean that there might be a relation with the 
January effect as well. Therefore, we verify in several ways whether there might be 
some relation between this effect and our oil effect. First, we check for the existence 
of a December effect and an adjusted Sell in May effect (adjusted in the sense that we 
consider the month’s April trough September instead of May through October, as we 
lag the oil price change one month) in oil returns using the following regression:  
 
t
adjusted
t
oil
t Sr εαµ ++= 1   with ε t t t tr E r= − −1[ ]     (2) 
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where adjustedtS is a dummy that takes the value 1 during the months October through 
March and zero otherwise. For the December dummy we take the same approach. 
Then, using a similar regression for stock returns (but  now using a January dummy 
and a Sell in May dummy unadjusted) we verify the results of Bouman and Jacobsen 
(2002) and finally we include a Halloween/Sell in May dummy and a January dummy 
in equation 1: the regression with the oil effect.  
 
Based on equation 2 we find no statistically significant adjusted Sell in May effect in 
oil returns, but for Arab Light and Dubai oil we do find a significant December effect. 
In table V we report the results of these regressions. Some oil series show a slight 
tendency to be somewhat lower during the ‘winter’ months than during the remainder 
of the year. In table VI we report our t-values for all relevant regressions based on 
equation 1. First, we report all t-values for the individual variables (Oil, Sell in May 
Dummy and January Dummy) included separately in equation 1, then we report 
results of combinations of these variables. (Oil and January combined in one 
regression; Oil and the Sell in May effect combined in one regression, and finally all 
three variables included in one regression).  
 
Please insert table V and table VI around here. 
 
We find a significant January effect present in 8 of the developed markets, the world 
market index and 7 of the ‘emerging’ markets. Probably due to our later ending date 
(April 2003 versus August 1998) we find even stronger evidence of the existence of a 
Sell in May effect in stock returns than Bouman and Jacobsen (2002). This effect is in 
our sample statistically significant in 16 of the 18 developed markets, the world 
market index, and 17 of the ‘emerging’ countries. While results tend to become less 
stronger for the combination of variables, we find no evidence that one effect can be 
explained by another. The oil effect is robust to the inclusion of both the January 
effect and the Sell in May effect. In a regression where we include all three variables, 
the oil effect remains present in all but two ‘emerging’ countries. Only the January 
effect seems to suffer from the inclusion of the other two variables. It is now 
significant in only three of the developed markets and one of the emerging markets. 
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All in all it seems unlikely that the oil effect is related to one of these calendar 
anomalies. 
 
C Economic significance and market timing ability 
The existence of many so-called anomalies can easily be explained by introducing 
transaction costs. For instance, if potential benefits do not outweigh the costs of 
trading – in which the Monday effect is a clear example. From a practical point of 
view it is interesting to consider how a trading strategy based on this simple market 
wisdom would perform in comparison with a simple buy and hold strategy. Here, we 
carry out this comparison in more detail. For the developed markets we split our 
sample in two, use the first half to estimate our model and use this model in the 
second half of our sample to judge the economic significance. Note that even while 
we test economic significance in the second half of our sample, these results must still 
be seen as in sample results: we already know the effect continues to exist in the 
second half of our sample12,13. The main reason why we investigate the economic 
significance is to get some indication about the size of the outperformance that could 
be obtained.  
For our oil strategy we take the following approach. Based on our regression results 
we determine whether the expected return (conditional on the oil price change in the 
previous month) in a month will be higher or lower than the risk free rate. If the 
expected return is higher (bull market) we fully invest in the market portfolio, if it is 
lower (bear market) we invest in short term bills. As such a strategy can easily be 
implemented using index futures we assume switching costs of 0.10 percent (see also 
Solnik, 1993).  
 
For every country this gives us the results of our oil strategy portfolio. We compare 
the risk and return characteristics of this strategy with a buy and hold portfolio and 
test whether we can reject the null hypothesis that the risk free rate and the market 
portfolio span the results of this trading strategy. All results include transaction costs 
                                                 
12  If we use the full sample to estimate equation 1 in the text and then use the same strategy we find 
qualitatively similar results.  
13 In a practical setting an investor would probably re-estimate the model every month using new data 
and a fixed window. However, the results reported here are simply intended to get some feel for results 
that could be obtained and given the in sample measurement we abstain from any further level of 
sophistication. 
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for switching of 0.10 percent. We compare risk and return of this trading strategy with 
a buy and hold benchmark and calculated Jensen’s alpha. Table VII contains our 
results for all developed markets and the world market index. 
 
Please insert table VII around here  
 
Columns 3, 4 and 5, give the mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio for the buy 
and hold strategy, columns 6 and 7 contain the mean and standard deviation for the oil 
strategy. Alpha and beta and their respective t-values (based on White standard errors) 
are calculated using the regression:  
 
( ) tftmarkettftyoilstrategt rrrr εβα +−+=−  with ε t t t tr E r= − −1[ ]    (3) 
 
where ftr denotes the risk free interest rate at time t
14.  
The fore last column of this table reports the maximum obtainable Sharpe ratio using 
this strategy based on the weights of the tangency portfolio constructed from buy and 
hold returns and oil strategy returns. The weight of the oil strategy in the tangency 
portfolio is reported in the last column. These are calculated from the regression 
results from equation 3. For instance, the Sharpe ratio for the buy and hold portfolio 
of a US investor would have been 0.35 over the period August 1988- April 2003. Had 
this investor invested in the mean variance efficient portfolio by investing 114% in the 
oil strategy (and shorting the market 14%) he would have obtained a (maximum) 
Sharpe ratio of 0.68.  
As the null hypothesis that α (Jensen’s alpha) is equal to zero is frequently rejected, 
this shows that in most countries mean variance efficiency of the stock market index 
is rejected. Jensen’s alpha (after transaction costs) is around 4 percent annually on 
average.  The estimates of β are, not surprisingly, well below 1. This confirms that the 
                                                 
14 We used monthly short term interest rates (inter bank or treasury bill rates) taken from either the 
IMF or OECD. We took IMF interest rates when these rates are available for the full sample period, 
otherwise we took OECD or short term interest rates. For Belgium, Canada, Singapore, Spain, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the World index we used treasury bill rates. 
We used government bond yields for France, the Netherlands and Norway, and Money Market rates 
(Federal Funds) for Denmark and Germany; government bond yields (medium term) for Australia and 
Italy and the official discount rate for Austria. For Japan we used the deposit rate. For Hong Kong we 
took the savings deposit rate. For Sweden we had to construct a time series of interest rates, as they 
were not available over the full sample. We used the treasury bill rate and from January 2002 the 
discount rate for Sweden. 
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oil strategy is substantially less risky than investing in the market index in the 
respective countries. In general substantial increases in Sharpe ratio’s would have 
been possible by switching form the buy and hold strategy to the oil strategy.  
 
Another way to test whether the oil strategy has forecasting power is to investigate the 
market timing ability of this strategy. Merton (1981), and Henriksson and Merton 
(1981) developed a (non-parametric) test for evaluating the market timing ability of 
investment managers15. In their analysis, the investor predicts when stocks will out- or 
under perform bonds, but does not predict the magnitude of the superior 
performance16. The probability of a correct forecast, given that the stock return is 
below the risk free rate, is defined as p1 , and the probability of a correct forecast, 
given that the stock return is above the risk free rate, as p2 .  
 
We analysed whether the oil strategy has significant market timing ability (again for 
the second half of our sample for the developed markets and the world market). The 
analysis takes into account the possibility that forecasting skills are different for bull 
markets and for bear markets. The oil strategy predicts that treasury bills will 
outperform the stock market in a bear market as described above and that the stock 
market will outperform in the other months. The results of the non-parametric test are 
reported in table VIII.  
 
Please insert table VIII around here 
 
The null-hypothesis of no market timing ability is p p1 2 1+ = . The alternative 
hypothesis is p p1 2 1+ > 17. Perfect market timing ability gives p p1 2 2+ = . 
Henriksson (1984) used this test to investigate whether fund managers of 116 mutual 
funds exhibited positive forecasting ability over the period 1968-1980. For only four 
funds he was able to reject the null at 5% level. He found an average estimate for 
( )p p1 2+ of 0.984 with a standard deviation of 0.115. 
                                                 
15 As we already know the potential source of superior performance the Merton-Henriksson 
methodology is in our simple case similar to the methodology of Glosten and Jagannathan (1994). 
16 Note that no assumptions about the structure of equilibrium security prices are required, because ex 
ante the investment manager's predictions are known. 
17 If the forecasts are known and forecasters behave rationally, then a one tail test as we use is most 
appropriate. Otherwise, a two tailed test would be necessary. See Henriksson and Merton (1981). 
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Again also based on this measure the oil strategy does well – although somewhat less 
than on the other tests - when judged on its ability to time bear and bull markets. We 
find economically significant results in 6 of the 12 countries that showed a significant 
oil effect.  
 
Finally, just to illustrate the strength of the effect, figure 4 shows the end of period 
wealth of an initial investment of 100 units of local currency during approximately 30 
years in Italy. Italy is the country with the strongest outperformance. Clearly, 
following a consistent oil strategy would have resulted in substantial higher wealth, 
even if we incorporate transaction costs when compared to a simple buy and hold 
strategy. 
 
Summarising our results, we show that in most countries we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the risk free asset and the market index span the annual returns of this 
trading strategy (i.e. we reject mean variance efficiency of the index). Moreover, we 
find that this trading strategy has significant market timing potential in the Henriksson 
and Merton sense. All in all we find that – at least in sample - the oil strategy is 
interesting enough for practitioners to trade on. Outperformance tends to be large for 
most countries.  
 
 17 
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Oc
t-7
3
Oc
t-7
5
Oc
t-7
7
Oc
t-7
9
Oc
t-8
1
Oc
t-8
3
Oc
t-8
5
Oc
t-8
7
Oc
t-8
9
Oc
t-9
1
Oc
t-9
3
Oc
t-9
5
Oc
t-9
7
Oc
t-9
9
Oc
t-0
1
Year
En
d 
of
 p
er
io
d 
w
ea
lth Oil strategy
Buy-and-hold strategy
D Sectors 
Is the oil effect a sector-specific anomaly, or does it manifest itself in all sectors of the 
economy? This is an important question because if the anomaly is not sector-specific, 
we should look to macro economic factors to explain it. In table IX we check whether 
in the developed markets the effect is found in all sectors in the economy or whether 
the effect is driven by one sector. We do so using Datastream market indices and 
Datastream sector indices, as we had no MSCI sector indices available. Datastream 
assigns the oil industries generally to the sector “resources”. The first row for every 
country shows the statistical significance for the total market and might (although 
qualitatively similar) deviate from the results for the MSCI market indices reported in 
table I. 
 
Please insert table IX around here.  
  
Table IX makes it clear that the effect is country specific and not driven by specific 
sectors. If the effect is present in a country it tends to be present in all sectors. This 
concurs with our result that the effect tends to disappear when we include the world 
market index as an additional variable in regression 1, and suggests that the source of 
this predictability should be sought at the macro economic level. In addition, it is not 
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strongly present in the sector “resources”. If anything the effect tends to be less strong 
for this sector. This is confirmed if we analyze the specific oil sector indices available 
from Datastream. Table X contains our results for specific oil sector indices in the 
different countries that we could obtain.  
 
 Please insert table X around here 
 
We reach a similar conclusion. If the effect is present in a country, it will in general 
show in the oil sectors as well. Otherwise it does not. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
We find strong evidence that changes in oil prices forecast stock returns. This 
predictability is especially strong in the developed markets in our sample of countries 
and the world market index. This predictability is economically significant, robust 
over time and cannot be explained by the January effect or the Halloween effect. 
While one might expect that the oil effect is related to the (size of) specific sectors in 
different countries we find that this is not the case. It tends to be country specific. This 
suggests that it is a macro economic phenomenon. It might be that this predictability 
is related to the lagged reaction of the market to the general impact of oil price 
changes in the different economies. An alternative explanation could be that this 
predictability is related by a lagged reaction to the oil price change due to an increase 
in international political instability. Which of these explanations is most likely, needs 
further research. But even if we are able to determine the source of the predictability, 
we have no idea why financial markets react slowly to information in oil prices. That 
remains the real puzzle to be explained.  
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Table I. Summary Statistics of Stock Market Returns and Oil effect 
Country 
 
Starting 
Date 
# 
obs. 
Mean 
(%) 
Std. 
dev. (%) 1α  
t-value 
 
WT 
(1973) 
Dubai 
(1982) 
Brent 
(1987) 
Brent (F) 
(1988) 
Oil (F) 
(1983) 
Australia 1973-10 355 1.0 6.2 -0.031 -0.99  X X X X 
Austria 1973-10 355 0.5 5.6 -0.067 -1.65  X    
Belgium 1973-10 355 0.9 5.2 -0.095 -3.61 X X X X X 
Canada 1973-10 355 0.8 5.2 -0.040 -1.64  X    
Denmark 1973-10 355 0.8 5.2 -0.062 -2.04 X X X X X 
France 1973-10 355 0.9 6.3 -0.090 -2.56 X X X X X 
Germany 1973-10 355 0.7 6.0 -0.121 -3.13 X X X X X 
Hong Kong 1973-10 355 1.0 9.7 -0.017 -0.31      
Italy 1973-10 355 0.9 7.2 -0.153 -3.52 X X X X X 
Japan 1973-10 355 0.4 5.3 -0.061 -1.46      
Netherlands 1973-10 355 1.0 5.4 -0.107 -4.52 X X X X X 
Norway 1973-10 355 0.6 7.5 -0.067 -2.22      
Singapore 1973-10 355 0.4 8.0 -0.044 -0.95      
Spain 1973-10 355 0.8 6.4 -0.112 -2.38 X X X X X 
Sweden 1973-10 355 1.3 7.0 -0.122 -2.64 X X X X X 
Switzerland 1973-10 355 0.7 5.1 -0.114 -4.35 X X X X X 
UK 1973-10 355 1.0 6.1 -0.068 -2.14 X X X X X 
US 1973-10 355 0.9 4.7 -0.086 -3.57 X X X X X 
World Market 1973-10 355 0.7 4.2 -0.081 -2.90 X X X X X 
Argentina 1988-01 184 5.9 23.6 -0.171 -1.28      
Brasil 1988-01 184 11.3 19.8 -0.315 -2.63  X X X  
Chile 1988-01 184 1.9 7.0 -0.075 -1.51      
Finland 1988-01 184 1.1 10.1 -0.210 -2.69 X X X X X 
Indonesia 1988-01 184 1.1 12.9 -0.130 -1.35      
Ireland 1988-01 184 0.8 6.1 -0.086 -1.51  X   X 
Jordan 1988-01 184 0.5 4.2 -0.072 -2.50  X X X X 
Malaysia 1988-01 184 0.6 8.9 -0.020 -0.22      
Mexico 1988-01 184 2.5 8.9 -0.094 -1.41      
New Zealand 1988-01 184 0.4 6.0 -0.100 -2.06 X X X X X 
Philipines 1988-01 184 0.5 9.1 -0.083 -1.01      
Portugal 1988-01 184 0.3 6.4 -0.152 -3.51 X X X X X 
South Korea 1988-01 184 0.4 10.1 -0.172 -1.67  X X   
Taiwan 1988-01 184 0.4 11.5 -0.169 -1.53  X    
Thailand 1988-01 184 0.4 11.7 -0.188 -1.53  X X   
Turkey 1988-01 184 4.5 16.8 -0.092 -0.95      
China 1993-01 124 -1.4 11.6 0.026 0.21      
Columbia 1993-01 124 1.2 8.9 0.017 0.14      
India 1993-01 124 0.3 8.2 -0.128 -1.78  X    
Israel 1993-01 124 0.6 7.7 -0.178 -2.43  X  X X 
Pakistan 1993-01 124 0.8 11.9 -0.110 -1.10      
Peru 1993-01 124 1.3 8.9 -0.010 -0.10      
Poland 1993-01 124 1.8 14.7 -0.015 -0.14      
South Africa 1993-01 124 0.9 6.6 -0.035 -0.54      
Venezuela 1993-01 124 2.4 13.0 0.038 0.24      
Egypt 1995-01 100 0.8 8.1 -0.030 -0.47      
Hungary 1995-01 100 1.9 11.2 -0.069 -0.75      
Morocco 1995-01 100 0.6 4.4 -0.019 -0.38      
Russia 1995-01 100 1.2 21.1 -0.027 -0.13      
Czech Rep. 1997-01 76 0.7 9.6 0.000 0.00      
 
Notes: summary results on value weighted MSCI re-investment indices for several countries. Monthly mean 
returns as percentage, monthly standard deviation as percentage, 1α  refers to the parameter of regression equation 
(1). In addition we report related t-values based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for Arab Light oil 
series from Bloomberg. T-values in bold refer to significant t-values at the ten percent level. The last five columns 
indicate (with an ‘x’) whether results are also significant at the ten percent level for West Texas Intermediate series 
(starting Oktober 1973), Dubai oil series (starting Januari 1982), Brent oil series ( starting June 1987) and the 
Brent future series (starting May 1988) from IPE and the light crude oil future series from NYMEX (starting June 
1983).  
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Table II. Oil price series used 
Short Name 
 
Full name 
 
Source 
 
Starting Date 
Series 
Starting Date 
 Used 
Arab Light 
 
 
Arabian Gulf Arab Light 
Crude Oil Spot Price 
(US$/Barrel) 
Bloomberg 
 
 
December 1969 
 
 
October 1973 
 
 
West Texas 
 
 
West Texas Intermediate 
Oil Price (US$/Barrel) 
 
Global Financial Data 
 
 
May 1860 
 
 
October 1973 
 
 
Dubai 
 
 
Dubai Oil Spot Price 
(US$/Barrel) 
 
Bloomberg 
 
 
November 1981 
 
 
November 1981 
 
 
Brent 
 
Brent Crude – 
Physical FOB (US$/Barrel)
 
Datastream 
 
 
May 1987 
 
 
May 1987 
 
 
Brent Future 
 
 
IPE Brent Crude Oil 
continuous sett. price 
(US$/Barrel) 
Datastream 
 
 
June 1988 
 
 
June 1998 
 
 
Oil Future 
 
 
NYMEX Light crude oil 
continuous sett. price 
(US$/Barrel) 
Datastream 
 
 
March 1983 
 
 
March 1983 
 
 
 
 
Table III. Basic characteristics of oil price changes 
 Arab Light Brent West Texas Dubai Brent Fut. Oil Fut. 
 Mean (%) 0.59 0.13 0.52 -0.15 0.26 -0.05 
 Maximum (%) 83.79 38.92 37.14 53.68 37.96 36.89 
 Minimum (%) -48.51 -39.14 -35.25 -37.76 -34.31 -35.07 
 Std. Dev. (%) 10.78 10.99 8.50 10.34 9.61 9.70 
 # of Obs. 355 191 355 257 178 241 
ρ(1) 0.047 0.011 0.221 0.161 0.148 0.142 
Correlations Arab Light Brent West Texas Dubai Brent Fut. Oil Fut. 
Arab Light 1 0.87 0.74 0.90 0.92 0.76 
Brent 0.87 1 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.94 
West Texas 0.74 0.93 1 0.87 0.96 1.00 
Dubai 0.90 0.89 0.87 1 0.94 0.88 
Brent Fut. 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.94 1 0.97 
Oil Fut. 0.76 0.94 1.00 0.88 0.97 1 
 
Notes: summary results on oil price changes (measured as log returns). Monthly mean returns, maximum and 
minimum as percentage, monthly standard deviation as percentage. Correlations are pairwise correlations. Series 
end in April 2003. Arab Light series and West Texas Intermediate series starts Oktober 1973, Dubai oil series 
starts December 1981, Brent oil series starts June 1987, Brent future series starts July 1988, the light crude oil 
future series starts April 1983. ρ(1) denotes first order autocorrelation of these series. First order correlation for 
West Texas is significantly different from zero at the five percent level.  
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Table IV. Regression results on sub samples. 
Country Start End # Obser-
vations 
Mean (%) Std. Dev. 
(%) 
Alpha t-value 
Australia 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.30 7.75 0.01 0.20 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.68 3.99 -0.07 -2.53 
Austria 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.50 4.18 -0.03 -1.10 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.49 6.75 -0.11 -1.49 
Belgium 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.12 5.36 -0.08 -2.65 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.60 5.04 -0.11 -2.65 
Canada 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.82 5.76 -0.02 -0.67 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.66 4.54 -0.06 -1.74 
Denmark 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.88 4.82 -0.02 -0.49 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.83 5.58 -0.11 -2.19 
France 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.11 6.84 -0.08 -1.66 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.70 5.80 -0.10 -1.96 
Germany 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.75 5.17 -0.10 -2.17 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.56 6.68 -0.14 -2.28 
Hong Kong 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.20 10.91 -0.07 -0.93 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.77 8.25 0.04 0.50 
Italy 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.10 7.57 -0.12 -1.79 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.60 6.82 -0.19 -3.94 
Japan 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.22 4.53 -0.08 -1.72 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 -0.50 5.86 -0.05 -0.69 
Netherlands 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.18 5.40 -0.13 -4.35 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.79 5.36 -0.09 -2.26 
Norway 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.67 8.20 -0.08 -2.54 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.49 6.73 -0.05 -1.01 
Singapore 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.59 8.96 -0.06 -0.98 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.21 7.02 -0.03 -0.44 
Spain 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.91 6.26 -0.06 -0.97 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.76 6.62 -0.16 -2.60 
Sweden 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.58 6.12 -0.06 -1.18 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.95 7.76 -0.19 -2.90 
Switzerland 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.45 4.90 -0.11 -4.00 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.89 5.26 -0.12 -2.62 
UK 1973-11 1988-07 177 1.34 7.39 -0.06 -1.13 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.69 4.51 -0.08 -2.20 
US 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.83 4.97 -0.07 -2.05 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.89 4.35 -0.10 -3.18 
World 1973-11 1988-07 177 0.98 4.13 -0.07 -2.02 
 1988-08 2003-04 177 0.49 4.22 -0.09 -2.15 
 
Notes: summary results on value weighted MSCI re-investment indices for several countries on sub samples. 
Monthly mean returns as percentage, monthly standard deviation as percentage, 1α  refers to the parameter of 
regression equation (1). In addition we report related t-values based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard 
errors for Arab Light oil series from Bloomberg. T-values in bold refer to significant t-values at the ten percent 
level.  
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Table V. Tests for calendar effects in oil returns. 
  
December dummy 
  
Adjusted Sell in 
May dummy  
December and adjusted Sell in May jointly
 
Oil series Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
December 
estimate 
Decemer 
t-value 
Sell 
estimate 
Sell t-
value 
Arab Light -0.05 -2.27 -0.01 -0.53 -0.05 -2.18 0.00 0.17 
West Texas -0.02 -1.06 0.00 0.29 -0.02 -1.06 0.00 0.20 
Dubai -0.04 -2.13 -0.01 -0.51 -0.04 -1.98 0.00 0.01 
Oil Future -0.03 -1.32 0.00 0.06 -0.04 -1.41 0.01 0.53 
Brent -0.03 -1.49 -0.01 -0.40 -0.03 -1.37 0.00 -0.04 
Brent Future -0.02 -0.87 0.00 -0.18 -0.02 -0.81 0.00 0.04 
 
Notes: We report parameter estimates and t-values for regression equation (2) in the text where we include 
respectively a December dummy, an adjusted Sell in May dummy and both dummies jointly in the equation. t-
values in bold refer to significant t-values at the ten percent level.  
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Table VI. Oil predictability and the calendar anomalies 
 Start # Only Oil  Only Jan Only Sell Oil & Jan Oil & Sell Oil & Jan & Sell 
Country series obs. t-value t-value t-value 
Oil 
t-value 
Jan 
t-value 
Oil 
t-value 
Sell 
t-value 
Oil 
t-value 
Jan 
t-value
Sell 
t-value 
Australia 1973-11 354 -0.98 1.41 1.65 -0.91 1.36 -0.90 1.58 -0.86 1.00 1.25 
Austria 1973-11 354 -1.65 -0.18 3.59 -1.65 -0.30 -1.56 3.50 -1.58 -1.37 3.81 
Belgium 1973-11 354 -3.61 1.22 3.78 -3.51 1.07 -3.52 3.59 -3.49 0.20 3.44 
Canada 1973-11 354 -1.63 1.29 2.37 -1.56 1.21 -1.49 2.25 -1.46 0.65 1.98 
Denmark 1973-11 354 -2.04 2.84 1.10 -1.97 2.74 -1.99 0.93 -1.96 2.61 0.12 
France 1973-11 354 -2.56 1.42 3.54 -2.49 1.27 -2.44 3.37 -2.42 0.34 3.17 
Germany 1973-11 354 -4.20 0.73 2.67 -3.10 0.49 -3.06 2.43 -3.06 -0.44 2.42 
Hong Kong 1973-11 354 -0.31 1.70 1.29 -0.24 1.68 -0.22 1.26 -0.19 1.39 0.82 
Italy 1973-11 354 -3.51 3.60 3.84 -3.33 3.42 -3.59 3.64 -3.42 2.49 2.81 
Japan 1973-11 354 -1.46 1.33 3.16 -1.42 1.21 -1.36 3.11 -1.35 0.32 2.85 
Netherlands 1973-11 354 -4.52 1.47 3.75 -4.37 1.29 -4.33 3.51 -4.28 0.41 3.34 
Norway 1973-11 354 -2.22 2.61 1.87 -2.06 2.47 -2.00 1.75 -1.95 2.04 1.10 
Singapore 1973-11 354 -0.95 2.10 2.40 -0.84 2.05 -0.80 2.33 -0.75 1.59 1.74 
Spain 1973-11 354 -2.38 1.82 3.46 -2.33 1.71 -2.34 3.31 -2.31 0.76 2.97 
Sweden 1973-11 354 -2.64 2.46 3.55 -2.56 2.39 -2.62 3.36 -2.57 1.35 2.79 
Switzerland 1973-11 354 -4.34 1.11 2.21 -4.27 0.92 -4.24 1.94 -4.21 0.43 1.79 
UK 1973-11 354 -2.14 1.69 3.41 -2.02 1.59 -2.03 3.23 -1.96 1.02 2.86 
US 1973-11 354 -3.57 1.46 2.05 -3.48 1.26 -3.50 1.80 -3.45 0.85 1.49 
World Market 1973-11 354 -2.90 1.89 3.23 -2.83 1.68 -2.82 3.00 -2.79 0.90 2.66 
Argentina 1988-01 184 -1.28 0.05 0.58 -1.25 -0.05 -1.11 0.38 -1.11 -0.18 0.42 
Brasil 1988-01 184 -2.49 1.59 2.05 -2.47 1.46 -2.40 1.73 -2.33 1.11 1.26 
Chile 1988-01 184 -1.51 1.14 1.67 -1.42 1.01 -1.32 1.48 -1.29 0.67 1.19 
Finland 1988-01 184 -2.69 0.74 1.88 -2.69 0.44 -2.39 1.35 -2.41 0.03 1.25 
Indonesia 1988-01 184 -1.35 1.30 1.98 -1.27 1.17 -1.04 1.69 -1.02 0.56 1.47 
Ireland 1988-01 184 -1.51 2.10 2.94 -1.38 1.95 -1.21 2.77 -1.17 1.29 2.28 
Jordan 1988-01 184 -2.50 1.65 1.85 -2.34 1.34 2.12 -1.39 -2.09 1.01 1.06 
Malaysia 1988-01 184 -0.22 0.50 1.96 -0.19 0.47 0.03 1.90 0.02 -0.23 1.83 
Mexico 1988-01 184 -1.41 0.19 1.01 -1.42 0.06 -1.28 0.76 -1.29 -0.17 0.77 
New Zealand 1988-01 184 -2.06 1.04 0.55 -1.99 0.80 -1.99 0.11 -1.96 0.80 -0.10 
Philipines 1988-01 184 -1.01 1.41 1.88 -0.93 1.31 -0.79 1.70 -0.77 0.82 1.40 
Portugal 1988-01 184 -3.51 1.81 1.91 -3.34 1.60 -3.34 1.38 -3.26 1.35 0.91 
South Korea 1988-01 184 -1.67 1.72 1.66 -1.61 1.76 -1.53 1.29 -1.52 1.51 0.70 
Taiwan 1988-01 184 -1.53 1.92 3.14 -1.43 1.72 -1.19 2.87 -1.16 1.01 2.46 
Thailand 1988-01 184 -1.53 2.37 1.82 -1.45 2.39 -1.36 1.41 -1.33 2.07 0.77 
Turkey 1988-01 184 -0.95 1.92 1.77 -0.75 1.82 -0.56 1.61 -0.50 1.34 1.14 
China 1993-01 124 0.21 -1.18 -0.03 0.05 -1.18 0.20 0.00 0.08 -1.25 0.39 
Columbia 1993-01 124 0.14 1.01 1.56 0.27 1.03 0.29 1.53 0.36 0.73 1.24 
India 1993-01 124 -1.78 0.94 0.80 -1.66 0.73 -1.71 0.60 -1.63 0.57 0.38 
Israel 1993-01 124 -2.43 0.39 0.83 -2.45 -0.08 -2.30 0.50 -2.35 -0.26 0.52 
Pakistan 1993-01 124 -1.10 0.80 1.09 -0.94 0.65 -0.96 0.96 -0.86 0.45 0.81 
Peru 1993-01 124 -0.10 0.41 1.27 -0.04 0.40 0.05 1.28 0.07 0.14 1.20 
Poland 1993-01 124 -0.14 1.43 1.15 0.11 1.42 0.06 1.14 0.21 1.16 0.79 
South Africa 1993-01 124 -0.54 0.22 2.29 -0.52 0.15 -0.28 2.27 -0.33 -0.51 2.37 
Venezuela 1993-01 124 0.24 -0.90 -0.04 0.17 -0.90 0.24 0.00 0.18 -0.91 0.21 
Egypt 1995-01 100 -0.47 1.62 2.27 -0.08 1.59 -0.13 2.23 0.07 1.31 1.71 
Hungary 1995-01 100 -0.75 1.07 1.79 -0.48 1.01 -0.50 1.70 -0.35 0.78 1.44 
Marocco 1995-01 100 -0.38 0.40 1.71 -0.34 0.34 -0.20 1.67 -0.21 -0.17 1.59 
Russia 1995-01 100 -0.13 -0.64 1.32 -0.21 -0.67 0.04 1.33 -0.05 -1.15 1.60 
Czech Rep. 1997-01 76 0.00 1.62 1.05 0.18 1.61 0.22 1.03 0.30 1.11 0.75 
 
Notes: We report t-values for regression equation 1 in the text where we include respectively Oil returns, a January 
dummy, a Sell in May dummy and combinations of these variables in the in the equation. t-values based on 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for Arab Light oil series from Bloomberg. t-values in bold are 
significant at least at the ten percent level. 
 
 
Table VII. Economic significance of the oil strategy. 
 
Notes: economic significance results for all developed countries and the world market index. Results for the oil 
strategy based on parameter estimates of the regression model in equation one over the period October 1973 
through July 1988. Alpha en beta estimated by regression equation (3) in the text. t-values based on 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for Arab Light oil series from Bloomberg. t-values in bold are 
significant at least at the ten percent level. 
Country # obs. Buy & Hold Strategy 
Oil 
Strategy after transaction costs 
   
Mean 
(yearly 
in %) 
std.dev.
(yearly 
in %) 
Sharpe 
ratio 
mean 
(yearly 
in %) 
std.dev.
(yearly 
in %) 
alpha 
(yearly 
in %) 
 
t-value 
 
Beta 
 
t-value 
 
 
 
Max 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
 
Weight Oil 
in TP (%) 
 
Australia 177 8.2 13.8 0.03 3.8 10.2 -4.2 -2.38 0.55 9.30 -0.62 231 
Austria 177 5.9 23.4 0.06 9.6 15.6 4.5 1.50 0.44 5.42 0.40 156 
Belgium 177 7.2 17.5 0.09 11.3 10.6 5.1 2.33 0.38 5.36 0.62 144 
Canada 177 7.9 15.7 0.08 8.1 9.1 1.4 0.70 0.34 4.96 0.17 108 
Denmark 177 10.0 19.3 0.14 14.2 12.9 6.0 2.42 0.45 7.64 0.62 149 
France 177 8.4 20.1 0.17 11.1 12.2 3.7 1.44 0.37 6.45 0.54 146 
Germany 177 6.7 23.2 0.03 12.1 13.8 6.3 2.20 0.36 5.10 0.33 145 
Hong Kong 177 9.3 28.6 0.2 6.1 18.8 0.0 0.01 0.43 5.49 0.20 8 
Italy 177 7.2 23.6 -0.08 16.5 15.5 8.5 2.81 0.44 6.99 0.73 196 
Japan 177 -6.1 20.3 -0.35 -0.7 14.3 1.7 0.64 0.50 6.61 -0.39 -197 
Netherlands 177 9.5 18.6 0.15 12.3 10.8 4.8 2.06 0.34 5.26 0.55 126 
Norway 177 5.9 23.3 -0.1 9.0 13.3 2.1 0.75 0.32 5.50 0.18 263 
Singapore 177 2.5 24.3 0.02 3.4 17.3 1.2 0.37 0.50 6.30 0.10 168 
Spain 177 9.1 22.9 0.01 15.7 14.8 7.3 2.48 0.43 6.26 0.61 169 
Sweden 177 11.3 26.9 0.12 16.6 18.4 7.4 2.13 0.47 6.32 0.55 153 
Switzerland 177 10.7 18.2 0.34 13.0 11.9 6.2 2.53 0.43 6.10 0.75 119 
UK 177 8.2 15.6 0.02 11.2 10.2 3.4 1.73 0.42 6.80 0.41 164 
US 177 10.7 15.1 0.35 11.9 9.8 4.6 2.32 0.43 6.76 0.68 114 
World 177 5.9 14.6 0.04 8.8 9.2 3.5 1.91 0.40 6.30 0.47 153 
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Table VIII. Market timing ability of oil strategy. 
 
Notes: market timing results for all developed countries and the world market index. Results for the oil strategy 
based on parameter estimates of the regression model in equation 1 over the period October 1973 through July 
1988. p-values in bold are significant at least at the ten percent level.  
Country 
 
 
 
# obs. 
 
 
 
# of  
monthly 
bull 
markets 
 # of 
correct 
bull  
forecasts 
# of 
monthly 
bear 
markets
# of 
correct 
bear  
forecasts 
# of  
total 
correct  
forecasts 
total number 
of correct 
forecasts 
 (as %) 
market 
timing 
ability 
 
p-value 
 
 
 
average 
annual 
transaction 
costs (in%) 
total #  
transactions 
 
  
Australia 177 94 47 83 33 80 45.2 0.90 0.885 0.53 78 
Austria 177 93 48 84 46 94 53.1 1.06 0.184 0.54 79 
Belgium 177 98 50 79 42 92 52.0 1.04 0.274 0.54 79 
Canada 177 90 46 87 45 91 51.4 1.03 0.326 0.55 81 
Denmark 177 96 54 81 47 101 57.1 1.14 0.025 0.55 81 
France 177 98 50 79 43 93 52.5 1.05 0.226 0.54 79 
Germany 177 98 52 79 45 97 54.8 1.10 0.088 0.54 79 
Hong Kong 177 89 43 88 44 87 49.2 0.98 0.560 0.54 79 
Italy 177 82 48 95 57 105 59.3 1.19 0.005 0.54 79 
Japan 177 81 40 96 49 89 50.3 1.01 0.440 0.54 79 
Netherlands 177 102 53 75 42 95 53.7 1.07 0.146 0.54 79 
Norway 177 97 47 80 41 88 49.7 0.99 0.500 0.54 79 
Singapore 177 92 45 85 43 88 49.7 0.99 0.500 0.54 79 
Spain 177 94 48 83 45 93 52.5 1.05 0.226 0.54 79 
Sweden 177 98 55 79 46 101 57.1 1.14 0.025 0.55 81 
Switzerland 177 108 59 69 42 101 57.1 1.14 0.025 0.54 79 
UK 177 94 51 83 47 98 55.4 1.11 0.066 0.54 79 
US 177 107 56 70 40 96 54.2 1.08 0.115 0.54 79 
World 177 99 51 78 42 93 52.5 1.05 0.226 0.54 79 
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Table IX. Summary Statistics of Stock Sector Returns and Oil effect. 
Country Sector Start # 
obs. 
mean 
return 
(%)  
std. dev. 
(%) 
µ t-value α1 t-value 
Market 1973-11 354 1.06 6.23 0.01 3.26 -0.02 -0.70 
Resources 1973-11 354 0.95 7.71 0.01 2.31 0.01 0.33 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 1.00 6.48 0.01 2.97 -0.02 -0.66 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 1.03 6.16 0.01 3.27 -0.05 -2.16 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 1.15 8.79 0.01 2.56 -0.04 -0.50 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 1.02 5.67 0.01 3.51 -0.05 -1.93 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 1.33 7.09 0.01 3.69 -0.07 -1.62 
Non Cyc. Services 1993-08 117 1.10 6.24 0.01 1.96 -0.05 -0.81 
Utilities 1973-11 354 1.39 8.35 0.01 3.16 -0.02 -0.79 
Information Tech. 1994-06 107 2.14 11.36 0.02 1.95 -0.06 -0.53 
Au
st
ra
lia
 
Financials 1973-11 354 1.16 6.18 0.01 3.56 -0.02 -0.72 
Market 1973-11 354 0.61 5.53 0.01 2.23 -0.05 -1.30 
Resources 1988-01 184 0.85 8.63 0.01 1.36 -0.07 -0.90 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.67 7.06 0.01 1.86 -0.03 -0.66 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 -0.17 7.02 0.00 -0.34 -0.08 -2.20 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1995-03 98 1.28 8.17 0.01 1.53 0.01 0.15 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 0.74 7.54 0.01 2.05 -0.11 -2.24 
Cyclical Service 1988-07 178 -0.13 9.45 0.00 -0.10 -0.22 -1.75 
Non Cyc. Services 1992-09 128 -0.76 11.83 -0.01 -0.68 -0.24 -2.27 
Utilities 1989-01 172 0.71 7.29 0.01 1.37 -0.08 -1.22 
Information Tech. 1993-08 117 0.05 10.98 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.62 
Au
st
ria
 
Financials 1973-11 354 0.92 6.11 0.01 2.92 -0.03 -0.77 
Market 1973-11 354 0.81 5.13 0.01 3.12 -0.09 -3.55 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.70 6.07 0.01 2.38 -0.09 -2.16 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.87 6.18 0.01 2.88 -0.11 -2.90 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1997-06 71 0.72 9.24 0.01 0.78 -0.19 -2.57 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 1.04 7.68 0.01 2.70 -0.08 -1.98 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.86 6.25 0.01 2.76 -0.08 -2.27 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 1.11 7.46 0.01 3.08 -0.14 -3.88 
Utilities 1973-11 354 0.96 5.14 0.01 3.65 -0.05 -2.05 
Information Tech. 1986-07 202 0.39 12.51 0.00 0.52 -0.18 -2.43 
Be
lg
iu
m
 
Financials 1973-11 354 0.81 5.13 0.01 3.17 -0.08 -2.92 
Market 1973-11 354 0.81 4.73 0.01 3.38 -0.04 -1.74 
Resources 1973-11 354 0.64 6.65 0.01 1.87 -0.03 -0.94 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.49 6.45 0.01 1.52 -0.05 -1.53 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.78 7.16 0.01 2.16 -0.07 -2.03 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1977-03 314 0.65 12.76 0.01 0.97 -0.21 -3.47 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 1.23 5.50 0.01 4.38 -0.06 -2.26 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.60 5.42 0.01 2.23 -0.06 -1.82 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 1.16 5.32 0.01 4.14 0.01 0.29 
Utilities 1973-11 354 0.85 4.30 0.01 3.76 -0.01 -0.72 
Information Tech. 1973-11 354 0.67 9.29 0.01 1.47 -0.07 -1.26 
C
an
ad
a 
Financials 1973-11 354 1.07 5.09 0.01 4.10 -0.04 -1.53 
Market 1973-11 354 0.90 5.17 0.01 3.44 -0.07 -2.42 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.64 7.41 0.01 1.69 -0.04 -0.78 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.57 7.03 0.01 1.58 -0.03 -0.74 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 0.39 8.07 0.00 1.04 -0.09 -2.70 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 1.12 6.11 0.01 3.68 -0.08 -2.40 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.83 7.51 0.01 2.20 -0.08 -2.19 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 1.16 9.24 0.01 2.55 -0.13 -2.97 
Utilities 1988-05 180 2.24 11.73 0.02 2.54 -0.03 -0.41 
Information Tech. 1999-04 49 -0.19 18.45 0.00 0.13 -0.26 -1.19 
D
en
m
ar
k 
Financials 1973-11 354 1.13 5.76 0.01 3.75 -0.02 -0.66 
Market 1973-11 354 1.00 6.32 0.01 3.16 -0.09 -2.52 
Resources 1973-11 354 1.35 7.88 0.01 3.20 -0.01 -0.24 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 1.14 6.41 0.01 3.50 -0.07 -1.69 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.97 7.28 0.01 2.70 -0.09 -2.52 F
ra
nc
e 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 0.61 8.39 0.01 1.58 -0.13 -2.63 
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Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 1.07 6.40 0.01 3.28 -0.07 -2.02 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.72 7.50 0.01 2.01 -0.11 -2.34 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 1.25 7.63 0.01 3.23 -0.07 -2.41 
Utilities 2000-08 33 -1.56 12.15 -0.02 -0.76 -0.18 -0.78 
Information Tech. 1973-11 354 1.06 10.63 0.01 2.08 -0.15 -3.43 
 
Financials 1973-11 354 1.13 6.26 0.01 3.55 -0.08 -2.42 
Market 1973-11 354 0.63 5.34 0.01 2.53 -0.11 -3.19 
Resources 1988-11 174 0.82 4.47 0.01 2.39 0.03 0.83 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.70 5.58 0.01 2.61 -0.09 -2.55 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.68 5.58 0.01 2.50 -0.09 -2.42 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 0.52 7.34 0.01 1.55 -0.12 -3.37 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 0.52 7.34 0.01 1.55 -0.12 -3.37 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.45 5.97 0.01 1.69 -0.11 -2.67 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 0.31 8.20 0.00 0.91 -0.13 -2.83 
Utilities 1973-11 354 0.81 3.51 0.01 4.54 -0.05 -2.16 
Information Tech. 1988-12 173 2.02 12.71 0.02 2.24 -0.20 -2.17 
G
er
m
an
y 
Financials 1973-11 354 0.64 6.55 0.01 2.10 -0.12 -3.22 
Market 1973-11 354 1.11 9.59 0.01 2.22 -0.02 -0.42 
Resources 1988-05 180 0.94 24.73 0.01 0.48 0.19 1.29 
Basic Industries 1987-06 191 0.44 11.54 0.00 0.52 0.02 0.21 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 1.09 11.67 0.01 1.83 -0.05 -0.69 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1991-07 142 1.47 8.41 0.01 2.04 0.07 0.76 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1993-11 114 0.84 12.58 0.01 0.70 0.00 -0.03 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.78 9.33 0.01 1.64 -0.04 -0.65 
Non Cyc. Services 1988-03 182 0.55 9.61 0.01 0.76 0.05 0.61 
Utilities 1973-11 354 1.42 8.56 0.01 3.18 -0.02 -0.29 
Information Tech. 1988-07 178 0.83 15.35 0.01 0.74 -0.08 -0.72 
H
on
g 
Ko
ng
 
Financials 1973-11 354 1.22 10.04 0.01 2.32 -0.01 -0.25 
Market 1973-11 354 0.95 7.26 0.01 2.76 -0.15 -3.46 
Resources 1986-02 207 0.50 9.50 0.00 0.76 -0.15 -1.94 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.51 8.15 0.01 1.39 -0.14 -2.69 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.55 8.78 0.01 1.40 -0.15 -2.74 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 0.89 9.71 0.01 1.99 -0.19 -3.55 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1986-02 207 0.26 7.47 0.00 0.50 -0.13 -3.57 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.63 9.77 0.01 1.33 -0.09 -2.23 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 1.20 8.48 0.01 2.97 -0.19 -3.70 
Utilities 1973-11 354 1.21 8.17 0.01 2.90 -0.08 -2.19 
Information Tech. 1986-02 207 -0.80 10.92 -0.01 -1.10 -0.25 -4.66 
Ita
ly
 
Financials 1973-11 354 0.98 7.53 0.01 2.72 -0.14 -3.49 
Market 1973-11 354 0.40 5.17 0.00 1.58 -0.05 -1.29 
Resources 1973-11 354 0.31 8.19 0.00 0.76 -0.04 -0.64 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.27 5.99 0.00 0.96 -0.05 -1.10 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.40 6.10 0.00 1.39 -0.07 -1.59 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 0.51 6.21 0.01 1.68 -0.06 -1.34 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 0.58 4.89 0.01 2.35 -0.04 -0.82 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.36 4.88 0.00 1.56 -0.06 -1.55 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 0.87 8.52 0.01 1.98 -0.04 -0.76 
Utilities 1973-11 354 0.70 6.43 0.01 2.08 -0.01 -0.16 
Information Tech. 1973-11 354 0.51 8.29 0.01 1.31 -0.10 -2.00 
Ja
pa
n 
Financials 1973-11 354 0.24 6.90 0.00 0.72 -0.05 -0.99 
Market 1973-11 354 0.96 4.96 0.01 4.02 -0.10 -4.74 
Resources 1973-11 354 1.21 5.96 0.01 4.02 -0.09 -3.41 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.55 7.53 0.01 1.64 -0.14 -3.20 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.70 8.73 0.01 1.76 -0.16 -4.76 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 1.18 7.77 0.01 3.13 -0.14 -4.63 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 1.08 5.27 0.01 4.05 -0.08 -2.80 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.80 6.03 0.01 2.81 -0.12 -4.15 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 0.97 8.22 0.01 2.50 -0.15 -4.01 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
Information Tech. 1985-06 215 0.86 11.36 0.01 1.13 -0.24 -4.20 
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 Financials 1973-11 354 0.85 5.07 0.01 3.42 -0.09 -3.52 
Market 1980-02 279 0.87 7.48 0.01 1.94 -0.06 -1.54 
Resources 1980-02 279 0.73 8.83 0.01 1.37 -0.03 -0.60 
Basic Industries 1980-02 279 0.98 8.45 0.01 1.96 -0.11 -2.14 
General Industrials 1980-02 279 1.01 9.73 0.01 1.74 -0.04 -0.69 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1994-08 105 1.35 7.31 0.01 1.90 -0.04 -0.65 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1980-02 279 1.49 9.92 0.01 2.51 -0.01 -0.10 
Cyclical Service 1980-02 279 1.37 15.28 0.01 1.50 -0.08 -1.21 
Non Cyc. Services 1999-08 45 -1.48 16.38 -0.01 -0.54 -0.16 -0.77 
Utilities 1980-02 279 1.25 9.69 0.01 2.16 -0.08 -1.30 
Information Tech. 1983-12 233 0.02 12.22 0.00 0.02 -0.10 -1.38 
N
or
w
ay
 
Financials 1980-02 279 1.13 9.02 0.01 2.09 0.00 0.04 
Market 1973-11 354 0.49 8.11 0.01 1.22 -0.05 -1.15 
Resources 1990-12 149 -0.11 9.94 0.00 -0.11 0.15 1.02 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.87 12.20 0.01 1.39 -0.04 -0.59 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.44 9.54 0.00 0.97 -0.08 -1.46 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1983-02 243 0.50 11.56 0.00 0.67 0.03 0.27 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 0.74 7.84 0.01 1.82 -0.02 -0.41 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.58 8.70 0.01 1.34 -0.05 -1.03 
Non Cyc. Services 1980-01 280 0.08 9.59 0.00 0.14 -0.06 -0.82 
Utilities 2001-02 27 4.76 16.26 0.04 1.42 0.38 1.49 
Information Tech. 1991-08 141 -0.80 15.90 -0.01 -0.57 -0.10 -0.65 
Si
ng
ap
or
e 
Financials 1973-11 354 0.59 9.37 0.01 1.26 -0.05 -0.94 
Market 1987-04 193 0.85 6.42 0.01 1.99 -0.16 -2.88 
Resources 1987-04 193 1.07 7.63 0.01 2.04 -0.12 -1.98 
Basic Industries 1987-04 193 0.79 8.75 0.01 1.35 -0.18 -2.13 
General Industrials 1987-04 193 0.31 7.29 0.00 0.65 -0.13 -2.24 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1987-04 193 -0.57 11.33 -0.01 -0.65 -0.19 -1.80 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1987-04 193 0.50 8.47 0.01 0.88 -0.14 -2.17 
Cyclical Service 1987-04 193 0.85 6.14 0.01 2.04 -0.13 -2.97 
Non Cyc. Services 1987-04 193 1.19 8.27 0.01 2.07 -0.12 -2.10 
Utilities 1987-04 193 1.17 6.36 0.01 2.70 -0.13 -2.68 
Information Tech. 1999-12 41 -4.67 25.37 -0.04 -1.14 -0.86 -2.70 
Sp
ai
n 
Financials 1987-04 193 0.79 7.34 0.01 1.61 -0.16 -2.60 
Market 1982-02 255 1.21 7.21 0.01 2.71 -0.17 -3.54 
Basic Industries 1982-02 255 1.21 7.23 0.01 2.69 -0.14 -2.97 
General Industrials 1982-02 255 1.11 7.41 0.01 2.41 -0.15 -2.79 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1982-02 255 1.43 8.93 0.01 2.62 -0.23 -5.08 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1991-08 141 0.93 6.74 0.01 1.68 -0.07 -1.22 
Cyclical Service 1985-06 215 2.12 7.81 0.02 4.04 -0.13 -2.73 
Non Cyc. Services 1994-06 107 1.44 11.54 0.02 1.41 -0.20 -2.34 
Utilities 1988-10 175 0.80 6.13 0.01 1.78 -0.08 -1.22 
Information Tech. 1982-02 255 1.11 14.83 0.01 1.18 -0.19 -2.21 
Sw
ed
en
 
Financials 1982-02 255 1.23 8.68 0.01 2.28 -0.18 -3.51 
Market 1973-11 354 0.70 4.75 0.01 3.11 -0.10 -3.63 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.53 5.51 0.01 2.10 -0.11 -3.07 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.35 6.54 0.00 1.22 -0.11 -2.85 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1986-08 201 0.82 9.99 0.01 1.30 -0.16 -1.91 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 0.62 9.77 0.01 1.30 -0.09 -2.64 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.39 6.64 0.00 1.42 -0.15 -4.43 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 0.62 9.77 0.01 1.30 -0.09 -2.64 
Utilities 1973-11 354 0.61 4.15 0.01 2.85 -0.03 -2.48 
Information Tech. 1983-08 237 -0.36 11.32 0.00 -0.50 -0.14 -2.13 
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
 
Financials 1973-11 354 0.76 5.73 0.01 2.77 -0.11 -3.61 
Market 1973-11 354 1.09 6.03 0.01 3.59 -0.07 -2.08 
Resources 1973-11 354 1.25 7.24 0.01 3.36 -0.06 -2.05 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.93 6.87 0.01 2.65 -0.05 -1.22 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.91 7.38 0.01 2.42 -0.05 -1.18 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 0.69 8.66 0.01 1.61 -0.07 -1.19 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 1.29 6.11 0.01 4.08 -0.05 -1.30 
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.94 6.86 0.01 2.74 -0.08 -1.94 
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Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 1.27 7.74 0.01 3.22 -0.08 -2.80 
Utilities 1973-11 354 1.14 5.34 0.01 3.00 -0.04 -1.17 
Information Tech. 1973-11 354 0.84 10.42 0.01 1.62 -0.09 -1.68  Financials 1973-11 354 1.15 6.85 0.01 3.32 -0.08 -2.21 
Market 1973-11 354 0.90 4.67 0.01 3.95 -0.09 -3.65 
Resources 1973-11 354 0.88 5.39 0.01 3.18 -0.04 -1.79 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.74 6.07 0.01 2.45 -0.06 -1.63 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.92 5.62 0.01 3.32 -0.08 -2.88 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 0.73 6.00 0.01 2.67 -0.13 -3.41 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 1.03 4.90 0.01 4.19 -0.08 -2.88 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.82 5.88 0.01 2.93 -0.12 -3.87 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 0.87 4.91 0.01 3.61 -0.08 -2.48 
Utilities 1973-11 354 0.82 4.45 0.01 3.58 -0.04 -1.29 
Information Tech. 1973-11 354 0.78 7.52 0.01 2.17 -0.12 -3.61 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
Financials 1973-11 354 1.07 5.69 0.01 3.85 -0.10 -3.36 
Market 1973-11 354 0.81 4.37 0.01 3.76 -0.06 -2.10 
Resources 1973-11 354 0.91 5.09 0.01 3.47 -0.04 -1.56 
Basic Industries 1973-11 354 0.66 5.03 0.01 2.62 -0.04 -1.05 
General Industrials 1973-11 354 0.78 4.97 0.01 3.15 -0.06 -1.66 
Cyc.Cons.Goods 1973-11 354 0.67 5.17 0.01 2.67 -0.08 -1.83 
Non Cyc.Cons.Gds 1973-11 354 0.98 4.22 0.01 4.62 -0.06 -2.23 
Cyclical Service 1973-11 354 0.74 4.76 0.01 3.20 -0.08 -2.38 
Non Cyc. Services 1973-11 354 0.84 4.84 0.01 3.45 -0.06 -1.78 
Utilities 1973-11 354 0.88 4.16 0.01 4.06 -0.02 -0.86 
Information Tech. 1973-11 354 0.77 6.92 0.01 2.31 -0.11 -3.02 
W
or
ld
 
Financials 1973-11 354 0.88 5.21 0.01 3.37 -0.06 -1.67 
 
Notes: summary results on Datastream market indices and sector indices for sectors of the developed countries and 
the world market countries. Monthly mean returns as percentage. monthly standard deviation as percentage. µ and 
α1 refer to the parameters of regression equation (1). In addition we report related t-values based on 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for Arab Light Oil series from Bloomberg. t-values in bold refer to 
significant t-values at the ten percent level. 
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Table X. Presence of the oil effect in specific oil sector indices. 
Country Sector Start # Obs. Mean 
monthly 
(in %) 
Std.dev. 
(in %) 
µ t-value α1 t-value
oil & gas 1973-11 354 0.92 9.66 0.01 1.71 0.06 1.93 
oil integrated 1990-04 157 1.19 10.80 0.01 1.38 -0.02 -0.28 
Australia 
exp & prod 1973-11 354 0.92 9.66 0.01 1.72 0.06 1.93 
oil & gas 1988-01 184 0.85 8.63 0.01 1.37 -0.07 -0.90 Austria 
oil integrated 1988-01 184 0.85 8.63 0.01 1.37 -0.07 -0.90 
Canada oil & gas 1973-11 354 0.66 7.03 0.01 1.80 -0.01 -0.17 
 oil integrated 1975-06 335 0.85 6.60 0.01 2.33 0.02 0.52 
 oil services 1973-11 354 0.90 15.27 0.01 1.07 0.04 0.72 
 exp & prod 1973-11 354 0.83 7.63 0.01 2.09 -0.02 -0.52 
oil & gas 1973-11 354 1.35 7.88 0.01 3.20 -0.01 -0.24 
oil integrated 1973-11 354 1.39 8.24 0.01 3.17 -0.01 -0.43 
oil services 1973-11 354 -0.06 12.57 0.00 -0.08 0.04 0.44 
France 
exp & prod 1988-07 178 0.80 24.82 0.01 0.40 0.18 1.25 
oil & gas 1988-07 178 0.78 24.81 0.01 0.39 0.18 1.24 
oil integrated 2001-05 24 6.35 17.62 0.06 1.73 0.76 1.80 
Hong Kong 
 
exp & prod 1988-07 178 0.80 24.82 0.01 0.40 0.18 1.25 
oil & gas 1986-02 207 0.50 9.51 0.00 0.76 -0.15 -1.94 
oil integrated 1995-12 89 1.21 7.06 0.01 1.74 -0.11 -1.65 
Italy 
oil services 1986-02 207 0.63 10.65 0.01 0.85 -0.14 -1.50 
oil & gas 1973-11 354 0.32 8.19 0.00 0.78 -0.04 -0.62 
oil integrated 1973-11 354 0.42 8.89 0.00 0.94 -0.04 -0.81 
oil services 1973-11 354 -0.51 14.91 0.00 -0.55 -0.13 -1.47 
Japan 
exp & prod 1973-11 354 0.31 8.34 0.00 0.74 -0.04 -0.63 
oil & gas 1973-11 354 1.21 5.96 0.01 4.02 -0.09 -3.41 
oil integrated 1973-11 354 1.21 5.96 0.01 4.02 -0.09 -3.41 
Netherlands 
oil services 1992-04 133 0.78 10.74 0.01 0.82 0.02 0.20 
oil & gas 1980-02 279 0.73 8.83 0.01 1.37 -0.03 -0.60 
oil integrated 1980-02 279 0.79 8.87 0.01 1.49 -0.04 -0.78 
oil services 1981-08 261 0.22 21.06 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.99 
Norway 
exp & prod 1980-07 274 0.38 11.98 0.00 0.52 0.01 0.10 
oil & gas 1990-12 149 -0.11 9.94 0.00 -0.11 0.15 1.02 
oil integrated 2002-01 16 -1.43 6.95 -0.02 -1.24 0.24 2.22 
Singapore 
exp & prod 1990-12 149 0.03 10.03 0.00 0.07 0.15 1.03 
oil & gas 1987-04 193 1.07 7.63 0.01 2.04 -0.12 -1.98 Spain 
oil integrated 1987-04 193 1.07 7.63 0.01 2.04 -0.12 -1.98 
oil & gas 1973-11 354 1.27 7.34 0.01 3.37 -0.06 -1.99 
oil integrated 1973-11 354 1.31 7.30 0.01 3.50 -0.06 -2.12 
oil services 1973-11 354 -0.13 17.49 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 -0.12 
United 
Kingdom 
exp & prod 1973-11 354 0.77 11.25 0.01 1.27 0.01 0.12 
oil & gas 1973-11 354 0.89 5.40 0.01 3.21 -0.05 -1.82 
oil integrated 1973-11 354 1.01 5.20 0.01 3.77 -0.05 -1.97 
oil services 1973-11 354 0.59 8.46 0.01 1.35 -0.04 -0.99 
United 
States 
exp & prod 1973-11 354 0.55 7.23 0.01 1.45 -0.02 -0.49 
oil & gas 1973-11 354 0.95 5.12 0.01 3.59 -0.04 -1.89 
oil integrated 1973-11 354 1.05 5.15 0.01 3.98 -0.05 -2.24 
oil services 1973-11 354 0.62 7.94 0.01 1.51 -0.03 -0.84 
World 
exp & prod 1973-11 354 0.88 6.38 0.01 2.58 0.00 -0.07 
Notes: summary results on Datastream sector indices for sectors of the countries and the world market which have 
available oil sectors. Monthly mean  returns as percentage. monthly standard deviation as percentage. µ and α1 
refer tot the parameters of regression equation (1). In addition we report related t-values based on 
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors for Arab Light oil series from Bloomberg. t-values in bold refer to 
significant t-values at the ten percent level. 
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